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ANALYSIS OF COMMODITY PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS FOR U.S. RICE 
 IN STOCHASTIC FRAMEWORK 




Potential adjustments in U.S. commodity program for rice are evaluated in this paper using stochastic 
analysis in a global modeling framework. Corresponding threshold and loss-compensatory increases 
in target price and loan rates are determined with assumed outright and gradual elimination of direct 
payments. Results show that if direct payments (DP) are eliminated in 2012, a 23% increase in both 
the target price (TP) and loan rate (LR) triggers counter-cyclical payments (CCP) 80% of the time; 
and it will take an increase of 48% in TP and LR to generate CCP enough to compensate for the loss 
in total DP. If DP is gradually removed over 5 years, the trigger and compensatory increases in TP 
and LR are 41% and 46%, respectively. Furthermore, if DP is eliminated outright and TP maintained, 
an increase of 71% in LR triggers loan deficiency payments (LDP) 75% of the time; and it will take 
an increase of 130% in LR to generate enough LDP to recoup the total loss in DP. Under gradual 
removal of DP, the trigger and compensatory increases in LR are 71% and 92%, respectively. 
Key words: U.S commodity program, threshold and loss-compensatory increases, stochastic analysis 
Arkansas Global Rice Model (AGRM) 
JEL Code: Q18 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the U.S., government farm program payments are an important component of income for farm 
businesses. Farm commodity program funding is being targeted for reduction to help decrease the 
federal budget deficit (Wailes et al., 2011). For the period 2000-2009, the government spent an 
average of $ 10.8 billion annually on various commodity support programs such as direct payments, 
marketing loan net outlays, counter-cyclical payments, ACRE payments, and crop market loss 
assistance. Direct farm program payments account for $5.04 billion or 47.0% of total payments per 
year.  Projected direct payments range from 2.4% to 10.8% of total returns, with the lower end for 
soybeans and the higher end for rice (FAPRI-MU, 2010).  
 In this study, we analyze the impact on farm income of potential changes in direct payment rate, 
target price, and loan rate in rice. The results presented in this paper can be used as inputs in the 
ongoing discourse on possible provisions of the next U.S. Farm Bill, considering that the current 
2008 Farm Bill will expire in 2012.  
As specified in the 2008 Farm Act, direct payments are fixed payments for eligible historic 
production of specific crop which is equal to the product of the payment rate for the specific crop, the 
historical payment acres (85 percent of base acres in CYs 2008 and 2012 and 83.3 percent in CYs 
2009-11), and the historical payment yield for the farm. Direct payments are not tied to current 
production or prices and do not require any commodity production on the land. Counter-cyclical 
payments are available to producers with historic program payment acres and yields of a specific 
crop, and payments are made whenever the commodity's effective price is less than the target price. 
The effective price of a commodity is the sum of the direct payment rate, plus either the national 
commodity loan rate or the national average farm price for the crop year, whichever is higher. The 4 
 
counter-cyclical payment amount is calculated as the product of the payment rate, the payment acres 
(85 percent of base acres in CYs 2008-12), and the payment yield.  Loan deficiency payments, a 
provision initiated in the Food Security Act of 1985 that gives the Secretary of Agriculture discretion 
to provide direct payments for loan commodities to producers who agree not to obtain a commodity 
loan on their production for a particular crop year. The LDP provision is applicable only if a 
marketing loan repayment provision has been implemented (i.e., if the market price of a commodity 
is below the commodity loan rate). The LDP payment amount is determined by multiplying the local 
marketing loan repayment rate by the amount of the commodity eligible for a loan. Instead of taking 
out a commodity loan, eligible farmers may choose to receive marketing loan benefits through LDPs 
when market prices are lower than commodity loan rates. The LDP option allows the producer to 
receive the benefits of the marketing loan program without having to take out and subsequently repay 
a commodity loan. The LDP rate is the amount by which the loan rate exceeds the loan repayment 
rate or prevailing world market price and, thus, is equivalent to the marketing loan gain that could 
alternatively be obtained for crops under loan (USDA).  
METHODOLOGY 
We used the Arkansas Global Rice Model (AGRM) in the analysis, with focus on the U.S. sub-model 
component.  AGRM is a multi-country econometric framework which has over 250 equations 
representing rice supply and demand relationships in 40 countries and 5 regions around the world 
developed and maintained by the Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, 
University of Arkansas in Fayetteville. The theoretical structure and the general equations of the 
AGRM are available online in the documentation by Wailes and Chavez (2011). 5 
 
To make the results more useful for alternative policy decision-making, this study makes use of a 
combination of deterministic and stochastic analyses. Stochastic analysis is useful as it provides 
information on the possible range of outcomes as opposed to the deterministic analysis which 
generates only point estimates.   The analysis covers the five-year period 2012 through 2016. The 
specific scenarios include the following: 
Scenario1a:  Deterministic analysis of removing total direct payments starting in 2012, and 
determining the common percent increases in target price and loan rate by year that would 
trigger counter-cyclical payments.  
Scenario 1b:  Stochastic analysis of Scenario 1a. 
Scenario 1c:  Extending scenario 1a and determining the common percent increases in target 
price and loan rate by year to generate counter-cyclical payments sufficient to fully 
compensate for the total loss in direct payments. 
Scenario2a:  Deterministic analysis of removing direct payments gradually at 20% per year 
starting in 2012, resulting in total elimination by 2016, and determining the common percent 
increases in target price and loan rate by year that would trigger counter-cyclical payments. 
Scenario 2b:  Stochastic analysis of Scenario 2a. 
Scenario 2c:  Extending scenario 2a and determining the common percent increases in target 
price and loan rate by year to generate counter-cyclical payments sufficient to fully 
compensate for the total loss in direct payments. 
Scenario 3a:  Deterministic analysis of eliminating total direct payments starting in 2012, and 
determining the percent increases in loan rate by year that would trigger loan deficiency 
payments, keeping the target price constant. 
Scenario 3b:   Stochastic analysis of Scenario 3a.  6 
 
Scenario 3c:  Extending scenario 3a and determining the percent increases in loan rate by 
year to generate loan deficiency payments sufficient to fully compensate for the total loss in 
direct payments. 
Scenario 4a:   Deterministic analysis of removing direct payments gradually at 20% per year 
starting in 2012, resulting in total elimination by 2016, and determining the percent increases 
in loan rate by year that would trigger loan deficiency payments, keeping the target price 
constant. 
Scenario 4b:  Extending scenario 4a and determining the percent increases in loan rate by 
year to generate loan deficiency payments sufficient to fully compensate for the total loss in 
direct payments. 
This analysis is based on the August 2011 AGRM estimates of the U.S. rice season average farm 
price and average world price, and monthly indices of production, marketing, and announced world 
price for the period 2002-2009 (excluding 2007 and 2008 when the price spikes occurred).  All the 
changes in the scenarios are relative to the AGRM baseline as of August 2011 (Tables 1a-1d). The 
baseline projections are based on assumptions of current policies, macroeconomic variables, and 
average weather conditions.  
The stochastic component looks at the probability distribution of outcomes for scenarios 1a, 2a, and 
3a.  The stochastic framework used in this study is generated using empirical distributions of the 
variable yield for each country and region in the model, as well as for each of the six rice-producing 
states in the U.S. Yield is used because it is the variable that not only differs by year and region but is 
also very sensitive to changes in weather conditions and water availability. A total of 500 random 7 
 
draws were implemented using a 28-year empirical distribution of historical yields generated using 
the software Simetar (Richardson et. al, 2008).   
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The detailed results of the analyses are presented in Tables 2a-5b and Figures 1-3. 
Scenario 1a:  Table 2a shows that if direct payments were to be totally removed starting in 2012, 
increasing both the target price and loan rate by 23.23% (to $12.94 and $8.01 per cwt, respectively) in 
2012 triggers counter-cyclical payments (CCP).   CCP-triggering percent increases in target prices 
and loan rates for the rest of the period range from 20.71% to 27.67%.  This is the deterministic 
component of scenario 1a analysis. 
Scenario 1b:  The stochastic analysis for scenario 1a generates percentile probability distribution of 
CCP shown in Tables 2b (total in $ million) and 2c ($ per cwt).  In other words, it is probable that 
80% of the time there will be CCP.  For example, 10% of the time there will be CCP higher than 
$341.3 million (total) or $1.78 per cwt.  Figure 1 shows the CDF and PDF quartile values for this 
scenario, showing that zero CCP occurs 25.5% of the time.  It is probable that 74.5% of the time the 
government will have CCP expenditure of $700K or higher, with maximum of $671.3 million. The 
upper quartile shows that 25% of the random draws generate at least $461.9 million.      
Scenario 1c:   If total direct payments were to be eliminated starting in 2012, both the target price 
and loan rate have to be increased by 47.95% (to $15.53 and $9.62 per cwt, respectively) in 2012 to 
generate enough counter-cyclical payments to recoup the total loss in direct payments in the same 
year.  Note that the absolute amount of the negative change in direct payments is the same as the 8 
 
positive change in CCP. For the other years, compensatory percent increases in target prices and loan 
rates range from 45.43% to 52.39% (Table 2d).    
Scenario 2a:   Table 3a shows that if direct payments were to be gradually removed at 20% per year 
starting in 2012, increasing both the target price and loan rate by 41.14% (to $14.82 and $9.17 per 
cwt, respectively) in 2012 triggers counter-cyclical payments (CCP).  CCP-triggering percent 
increases in target prices and loan rates for the rest of the period range from 26.31% to 36.86%. 
Scenario 2b:   The stochastic analysis for scenario 2a generates percentile probability distribution 
similar to that of scenario1a but with relatively lower CCP values, as expected (Tables 3b and 3c).  
Figure 2 also shows values similar to those of scenario 1a, but with slightly higher upper quartile and 
maximum values.       
Scenario 2c:   If total direct payments were to be gradually removed at 20% per year starting in 2012, 
both the target price and loan rate have to be increased by 46.08% (to $15.34 and $9.50 per cwt, 
respectively) in 2012 to generate enough counter-cyclical payments to recoup the total loss in direct 
payments in the same year.  Again, note that the absolute amount of the negative change in direct 
payments is the same as the positive change in CCP. For the other years, compensatory percent 
increases in target prices and loan rates range from 44.50% to 52.39% (Table 3d).    
Scenario 3a:   Table 4a shows that if direct payments were to be totally removed starting in 2012, 
increasing the loan rate by 71.00% (to $11.12 per cwt) in 2012 triggers loan deficiency payments 
(LDP).  LDP-triggering percent increases in loan rates for the other years range from 72.78% to 
82.36%.    9 
 
Scenario 3b:  The stochastic analysis for scenario 3a generates CDF shown in Figure 3, indicating 
that there will be no loan deficiency payments 24.6% of the time. It is probable that 75.4% of the time 
there will be LDP of $20K or higher, with maximum of $448.3 million. The upper quartile indicates 
that 25% of the random draws result in at least $244.0 million LDP. 
Scenario 3c:   If total direct payments are eliminated in 2012, the loan rate has to be increased by 
129.82% (to $14.94 per cwt) in 2012 to generate enough loan deficiency payments to recoup the loss 
in direct payments in the same year. Note that the absolute amount of the negative change in direct 
payments is the same as the positive change in LDP. Other compensatory percent increases in loan 
rates by year (which range from 129.23% to 131.76%) are presented in the Table 4b.     
Scenario 4a:  If direct payments are removed gradually at 20% per year as shown in Table 5a, the 
same loan rate trigger results as in scenario 3a are obtained. For this reason, no stochastic analysis is 
done for this scenario—as results would have been similar to those of scenario 3b.    
Scenario 4b:  If direct payments are removed gradually at 20% per year, the loan rate has to be 
increased by 91.83% (to $12.47 per cwt) in 2012 to generate enough loan deficiency payments to 
match the loss in direct payments in the same year.  Again, note that the absolute amount of the 
negative change in direct payments is the same as the positive change in LDP. Table 5b shows the 
annual percent compensatory increases in loan rates by year (which range from 103.00% to 
133.61%). 
Counter-cyclical payments are decoupled, i.e., the producers do not have to produce rice to receive 
payments.  This is the reason why there is no supply and demand response to scenarios 1b and 2b as 
loan rates and target prices are increased substantially. Loan deficiency payments, on the other hand, 10 
 
are coupled which means that the producers have to produce rice to receive the payment benefits. 
This explains why scenarios 3b and 4b which increase loan rates substantially generate supply and 
demand responses (Tables 4b and 5b).  Area, production, exports and stocks increase while domestic 
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Table 1a.   U.S.  Rice Baseline Program Particulars 
Variable 
Units / 
Year  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
YIELD  (rough  basis)  (lb/ac) 7228.23 7284.02 7340.52 7394.63 7458.18 
Program-Direct  Payment  Yield  (lb/ac) 4818.00 4818.00 4818.00 4818.00 4818.00 
Program-Counter-Cyclical  Payment  Yield  (lb/ac) 5131.00 5131.00 5131.00 5131.00 5131.00 
Program Area/Contract Area   (1000 ac)  4390.00  4390.00  4390.00  4390.00  4390.00 
Total  Harvested  Area    (1000  ac)  2921.50 2896.55 2912.04 2978.32 3016.31 
Table 1b.   U.S.  Rice Baseline Supply and Utilization 
Variable 
Units / 
Year  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Production  (mil.  cwt)  211.17 210.98 213.76 220.24 224.96 
Beginning Stocks   (mil. cwt)  24.33 23.75 23.94 20.70 24.19 
Imports  (mil.  cwt)  18.95 18.22 18.05 18.36 18.98 
Domestic  Use  (mil.  cwt)  136.55 138.16 139.95 141.58 142.93 
Exports  (mil.  cwt)  102.76 101.16 106.42 108.21 110.17 
Ending  Stocks  (mil.  cwt)  23.75 23.94 20.70 24.19 30.15 
Table 1c.   U.S.  Rice Baseline Prices 
Variable 
Units / 
Year  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Loan  Rate    (US$/cwt)  6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 
Season Ave. Farm Price   (US$/cwt)  12.94  12.96  12.67  12.79  13.40 
    Long Grain Farm Price  (US$/cwt)  12.13  12.17  11.73  11.87  13.17 
    Medium Grain Farm Price   (US$/cwt)  15.18  15.36  15.63  15.72  16.29 
Target  Price  (US$/cwt)  10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 
Export Price, FOB Houston  (U.S. No. 2)  (US$/cwt)  23.30  23.42  24.01  24.53  24.68 




Table 1d.   Detailed U.S.  Rice Baseline Payments and Income 
Variable 
Units / 
Year  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Direct  Payment  (US$/cwt)  2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 
Counter-Cyclical  Payment  (US$/cwt)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Average World Price   (US$/cwt)  11.85  11.98  12.26  12.64  12.61 
INCOME FACTORS 
Production Market Value   (mil. US$)  2732.29  2734.37  2709.17  2817.26  3128.00 
    Direct Payments  (mil. US$)  497.05  497.05  497.05  497.05  497.05 
    Marketing Loan Gains/LDPs  (mil. US$)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
    Counter-Cyclical Payments  (mil. US$)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Income from Commodity Payments  (mil. US$)  497.05  497.05  497.05  497.05  497.05 
Total Income  (mil. US$)  3229.34  3231.42  3206.22  3314.30  3625.05 12 
 
Table 2a.   Level changes for Scenario 1a (triggers for counter-cyclical payments) 
Variable 
Units / 
Year  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1.  Total elimination of direct payments starting in 2012 
2.  Percent increases in target price and loan rate that will trigger counter-cyclical payments 
Percent Increases     23.23%  23.43%  20.71%  21.83%  27.67% 
Rice Target Price  (US$/cwt)  12.94  12.96   12.67   12.79  13.41 
Rice Loan Rate  (US$/cwt)  8.01  8.02   7.85   7.92  8.30 
Level Changes: 
    Loan Rate   (US$/cwt)  1.51  1.52  1.35  1.42  1.80 
    Target Price  (US$/cwt)  2.44  2.46  2.17  2.29  2.91 
    Direct Payment Rate  (US$/cwt)  -2.35  -2.35  -2.35  -2.35  -2.35 
    Counter-Cyclical Payment Rate  (US$/cwt)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Total Direct Payments  (mil. US$)  -497.05  -497.05  -497.05  -497.05  -497.05 
Total Loan Deficiency Payments  (mil. US$)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 






Table 2b. Percentile Probability Distribution of Total Counter-Cyclical Payments for Scenario 1b, in Million Dollars 
Year  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  Average 
$ Million 
Stochastic Average  157.1  182.4  133.0  107.0  89.6  133.8 
Percentiles: 
5%  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
10%  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
20%  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
30%  34.2  5.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.9 
40%  90.3  96.3  39.4  0.0  0.0  45.2 
50%  126.5  148.4  90.8  33.6  11.6  82.2 
60%  186.2  220.3  149.0  97.3  67.8  144.1 
70%  236.1  282.1  199.7  160.8  122.9  200.3 
80%  290.6  338.0  251.8  222.0  184.1  257.3 
90%  361.9  427.5  339.6  309.2  268.2  341.3 















Table 2c. Percentile Probability Distribution of Counter-Cyclical Payments for Scenario 1b, in Dollars  Per Hundredweight 
Year  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  Average 
$ Per CWT 
Stochastic Average  0.82  0.95  0.69  0.56  0.47  0.70 
Percentiles: 
5%  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
10%  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
20%  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
30%  0.18  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 
40%  0.47  0.50  0.21  0.00  0.00  0.24 
50%  0.66  0.78  0.47  0.18  0.06  0.43 
60%  0.97  1.15  0.78  0.51  0.35  0.75 
70%  1.23  1.47  1.04  0.84  0.64  1.05 
80%  1.52  1.77  1.32  1.16  0.96  1.34 
90%  1.89  2.23  1.77  1.61  1.40  1.78 






Table 2d.   Level changes for scenario 1c (compensatory counter-cyclical payments for total loss in direct 
payments) 
Year  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  Average 
1.  Total elimination of direct payments starting in 2012 
2.  Percent increases in target price and loan rate to generate counter-cyclical payments to compensate for the total 
loss in direct payments 
Percent  Increases      47.95% 48.16% 45.43% 46.56% 52.39% 
Rice  Target  Price  (US$/cwt)  15.53 15.56 15.27 15.39    16.00 
Rice  Loan  Rate  (US$/cwt)  9.62 9.63 9.45 9.53    9.91 
Level Changes: 
    Loan Rate   (US$/cwt)  3.12  3.13  2.95  3.03  3.41 
    Target Price  (US$/cwt)  5.03  5.06  4.77  4.89  5.50 
    Direct Payment Rate  (US$/cwt)  -2.35  -2.35  -2.35  -2.35  -2.35 
    Counter-Cyclical Payment Rate  (US$/cwt)  2.60  2.60  2.60  2.60  2.60 
Total Direct Payments  (mil. US$)  -497.05  -497.05  -497.05  -497.05  -497.05 
Total Loan Deficiency Payments  (mil. US$)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 









Table 3a.   Level changes for scenario 2a  (triggers for counter-cyclical payments) 
Variable 
Units / 
Year  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1.  Remove direct payments over 5 years starting in 2012 at 20% equal reductions per year 
2.  Percent increases in target price and loan rate that will trigger counter-cyclical payments 
Percent  Increases      41.14% 36.86% 29.66% 26.31% 27.67% 
Rice Target Price   (US$/cwt)  14.82  14.37  13.61  13.26   13.41 
Rice  Loan  Rate  (US$/cwt)  9.17 8.90 8.43 8.21    8.30 
Level Changes: 
    Loan Rate   (US$/cwt)  2.67  2.40  1.93  1.71  1.80 
    Target Price  (US$/cwt)  4.32  3.87  3.11  2.76  2.91 
    Direct Payment Rate  (US$/cwt)  -0.47  -0.94  -1.41  -1.88  -2.35 
    Counter-Cyclical Payment Rate  (US$/cwt)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Total Direct Payments  (mil. US$)  -99.41  -198.82  -298.23  -397.64  -497.05 
Total Loan Deficiency Payments  (mil. US$)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 













Table 3b.  Percentile Probability Distribution of Total Counter-Cyclical Payments for 
Scenario 2b, in Million Dollars 
Year  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  Average 
$ Million 
Stochastic Average  153.1  176.5  128.0  101.7  85.4  128.9 
Percentiles: 
5%  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
10%  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
20%  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
30%  31.4  3.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.0 
40%  86.4  92.3  33.1  0.0  0.0  42.4 
50%  124.9  142.2  83.0  25.7  10.5  77.2 
60%  181.3  209.5  139.6  89.1  60.7  136.0 
70%  228.2  267.8  192.4  147.4  120.0  191.1 
80%  285.7  327.8  245.1  215.5  180.0  250.8 
90%  356.1  417.3  334.8  304.3  261.9  334.9 
95%  405.5  496.7  416.8  376.7  342.7  407.7 
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Table 3c.  Percentile Probability Distribution of Counter-Cyclical Payments for Scenario 
2b, in Dollars  Per Hundredweight 
Year  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  Average 
$ Per CWT 
Stochastic Average  0.80  0.92  0.67  0.53  0.45  0.67 
Percentiles: 
5%  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
10%  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
20%  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
30%  0.16  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 
40%  0.45  0.48  0.17  0.00  0.00  0.22 
50%  0.65  0.74  0.43  0.13  0.05  0.40 
60%  0.95  1.09  0.73  0.47  0.32  0.71 
70%  1.19  1.40  1.00  0.77  0.63  1.00 
80%  1.49  1.71  1.28  1.13  0.94  1.31 
90%  1.86  2.18  1.75  1.59  1.37  1.75 
95%  2.12  2.59  2.18  1.97  1.79  2.13 




Year  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1.  Remove direct payments over 5 years starting in 2012 at 20% equal reductions per year 
2.  Percent increases in target price and loan rate to generate counter-cyclical payments to compensate for the total 
loss in direct payments 
Percent  Increases      46.08% 46.75% 44.50% 46.09% 52.39% 
Rice  Target  Price  (US$/cwt)  15.34 15.41 15.17 15.34    16.00 
Rice  Loan  Rate  (US$/cwt)  9.50 9.54 9.39 9.50    9.91 
Level Changes: 
    Loan Rate   (US$/cwt)  3.00  3.04  2.89  3.00  3.41 
    Target Price  (US$/cwt)  4.84  4.91  4.67  4.84  5.50 
    Direct Payment Rate  (US$/cwt)  -0.47  -0.94  -1.41  -1.88  -2.35 
    Counter-Cyclical Payment Rate  (US$/cwt)  0.52  1.04  1.56  2.08  2.60 
Total Direct Payments  (mil. US$)  -99.41  -198.82  -298.23  -397.64  -497.05 
Total Loan Deficiency Payments  (mil. US$)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 











Table 4a.   Level changes for scenario 3a (triggers for loan deficiency payments) 
Variable 
Units / 
Year  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1.  Total elimination of direct payments starting in 2012 
2.  Percent increases in loan rate that will trigger loan deficiency payments; no change in target price 
Percent  Increases      71.00% 72.78% 76.82% 82.36% 81.92% 
Rice  Target  Price  (US$/cwt)  10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50    10.50 
Rice  Loan  Rate  (US$/cwt)  11.12 11.23 11.49 11.85    11.82 
Level Changes: 
    Loan Rate   (US$/cwt)  4.62  4.73  4.99  5.35  5.32 
    Target Price  (US$/cwt)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
    Direct Payment Rate  (US$/cwt)  -2.35  -2.35  -2.35  -2.35  -2.35 
    Counter-Cyclical Payment Rate  (US$/cwt)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Total Direct Payments  (mil. US$)  -497.05  -497.05  -497.05  -497.05  -497.05 
Total Loan Deficiency Payments  (mil. US$)  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Total Counter-Cyclical Payments  (mil. US$)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 




Year  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1.  Total elimination of direct payments starting in 2012 
2.  Percent increases in loan rate to earn loan deficiency payments to compensate for the total loss in direct payments; 
no change in target price 
Percent  Increases      129.82% 129.23% 130.02% 131.76% 129.78% 
Rice  Target  Price  (US$/cwt)  10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50    10.50 
Rice  Loan  Rate  (US$/cwt)  14.94 14.90 14.95 15.06    14.94 
Level Changes: 
Total  Harvested  Area    (1000  ac)  0.00 144.35 249.14 320.77 364.67 
Production  (mil.  cwt)  0.00  9.88 17.07 22.04 25.13 
Domestic Use (rough basis)  (mil. cwt)  0.00  0.23  0.42  0.57  0.59 
Beginning Stocks   (mil. cwt)  0.00 0.00 5.87  13.47  21.43 
Imports  (mil.  cwt)  0.00 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.12 
Exports  (mil.  cwt)  0.00 3.93 9.28  13.81  16.69 
Ending Stocks  (mil. cwt)  0.00  5.87  13.47  21.43  29.61 
PRICES: 
Loan  Rate    (US$/cwt)  8.44 8.40 8.45 8.56 8.44 
Season Ave. Farm Price   (US$/cwt)  0.00  -0.08  -0.24  -0.44  -0.39 
    Long Grain Farm Price  (US$/cwt)  0.00  -0.03  -0.14  -0.31  -0.22 
    Medium Grain Farm Price   (US$/cwt)  0.00  -0.15  -0.43  -0.69  -0.76 
Export Price, FOB Houston  (U.S. No. 2)  (US$/cwt)  0.00  -0.04  0.46  1.09  1.65 
Medium Grain Price, FOB CA (U.S. No. 2)  (US$/cwt)  0.00  -0.29  -0.62  -0.82  -0.87 
Direct  Payment  Rate  (US$/cwt)  -2.35 -2.35 -2.35 -2.35 -2.35 
Average World Price  (US$/cwt)  (US$/cwt)  0.00  -0.03  -0.13  -0.27  -0.28 
INCOME FACTORS: 
Production Market Value   (mil. US$)  0.00  111.16  159.96  174.61  252.75 
Total Direct Payments  (mil. US$)  -497.05  -497.05  -497.05  -497.05  -497.05 
Total Loan Deficiency Payments  (mil. US$)  497.08  497.15  497.15  497.07  497.06 
Total  Income  (mil.  US$)  0.03 111.27 160.06 174.63 252.76 17 
 
Table 5a.   Level changes for scenario 4a (triggers for  loan deficiency payments) 
Variable 
Units / 
Year  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1.  Remove direct payments over 5 years starting in 2012 at 20% equal reductions per year 
2.  Percent increases in loan rate that will trigger loan deficiency payments; no change in target price 
Percent  Increases  Percent  71.00% 72.78% 76.82% 82.35% 81.92% 
Rice Target Price   (US$/cwt)  10.50  10.50  10.50  10.50   10.50 
Rice  Loan  Rate  (US$/cwt)  11.12 11.23 11.49 11.85    11.82 
Level Changes: 
    Loan Rate   (US$/cwt)  4.62  4.73  4.99  5.35  5.32 
    Target Price  (US$/cwt)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
    Direct Payment Rate  (US$/cwt)  -0.47  -0.94  -1.41  -1.88  -2.35 
    Counter-Cyclical Payment Rate  (US$/cwt)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Total Direct Payments  (mil. US$)  -99.41  -198.82  -298.23  -397.64  -497.05 
Total Loan Deficiency Payments  (mil. US$)  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02 
Total Counter-Cyclical Payments  (mil. US$)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 




Year  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1.  Remove direct payment over 5 years starting in 2012 at 20% equal reductions per year 
2.  Percent increases in loan rate to earn loan deficiency payments to compensate for the total loss in direct payments; 
no change in target price 
Percent  Increases      91.83% 103.00% 115.48% 127.74% 133.61% 
Rice  Target  Price  (US$/cwt)  10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50    10.50 
Rice  Loan  Rate  (US$/cwt)  12.47 13.20 14.01 14.80    15.18 
Level Changes: 
Total Harvested Area   (1000 ac)  0.00  28.88  79.67  143.80  211.77 
Production  (mil.  cwt)  0.00 1.98 5.47 9.91  14.66 
Beginning Stocks   (mil. cwt)  0.00  0.00  1.16  3.78  7.97 
Imports  (mil.  cwt)  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 
DOMESTIC USE (rough basis)  (mil. cwt)  0.00  0.05  0.13  0.26  0.36 
EXPORTS    (mil.  cwt)  0.00 0.81 2.79 5.62 8.61 
ENDING  STOCKS  (mil.  cwt)  0.00 1.16 3.78 7.97  13.88 
PRICES: 
Loan  Rate    (US$/cwt)  5.97 6.70 7.51 8.30 8.68 
Season Ave. Farm Price   (US$/cwt)  0.00  -0.02  -0.07  -0.19  -0.24 
    Long Grain Farm Price  (US$/cwt)  0.00  -0.01  -0.04  -0.14  -0.15 
    Medium Grain Farm Price   (US$/cwt)  0.00  -0.03  -0.12  -0.29  -0.42 
Export Price, FOB Houston  (U.S. No. 2)  (US$/cwt)  0.00  -0.01  0.09  0.32  0.66 
Medium Grain Price, FOB CA (U.S. No. 2)  (US$/cwt)  0.00  -0.06  -0.19  -0.36  -0.51 
Direct  Payment  Rate  (US$/cwt)  -0.47 -0.94 -1.41 -1.88 -2.35 
Average World Price  (US$/cwt)  (US$/cwt)  0.00  -0.01  -0.03  -0.10  -0.14 
INCOME FACTORS: 
Production Market Value   (mil. US$)  0.00  22.27  53.57  82.38  146.71 
Total Direct Payments  (mil. US$)  -99.41  -198.82  -298.23  -397.64  -497.05 
Total Loan Deficiency Payments  (mil. US$)  99.46  198.85  298.26  397.76  497.10 
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